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CIVIL RIGHTS
SUMMARIES
PRATT v. SUMNER: NOTHING FRIVOLOUS
HERE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pratt v. Sumner! the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff
raised legal issues pertaining to the constitutionality of a total
ban on a felony prisoner's receipt of books from sources other
than bookstores and publishers that neither the Supreme Court
nor the Ninth Circuit had resolved. 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that Pratt's complaint alleging that he was denied meaningful access to the courts was not frivolous and had to be reviewed by the district court. 3
The Nevada State Prison "publisher or bookstore only" regulation provides that all hard-cover and soft-cover books sent to
prisoners be returned unless they originate from a publisher or
bookstore.· Pratt6 solicited law professors for legal texts tnat
they had authored. Books sent to Pratt by the law professors
were returned by prison officials."
1. 807 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were
Alarcon, J. and Boochever, J.).
2. Id. at 820.
3.ld.
4. Id. at 818.
5. Id. "Ray Donald Pratt is an inmate at the Nevada Stete Prison, a maximum security facility in Carson City_" Id_
6.ld.
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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 Pratt brought this civil rights
action claiming that he was denied meaningful access to the
courts because the law books were returned. Pratt alleged that
law professor James Jeans sent a soft-cover copy of his book,
Trial Advocacy,S and that without notice or a hearing, the
prison officials returned the book to Jeans. 8 Pratt alleged that
the "publisher or bookstore only" regulation was overly broad
and that the information in the text was not otherwise available
to him because of deficiencies in the prison's law library.lO Pratt
sought a declaratory judgment, arguing first that notice and a
hearing were required before such printed materials could be returned. Second, he contended that the soft-cover books were not
a threat to security and should not be banned under a "publishers or bookstore only" regulation. Third, Pratt argued that law
books should receive preferential treatment. Finally, he sought
damages and injunctive relief.l1
The action was submitted to a magistrate to determine
whether Pratt should be allowed to proceed without payment of
filing fees. 12 The magistrate allowed him to do so but concluded
that the action was frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. IS The district court
adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the
complaint. H Pratt appealed pro se to the Ninth Circuit.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of a rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.

Id.
8. J. Jeans, Trial Advocacy (1975).
9. Pratt,807 F.2d at 818.

10.Id.
11. Id. The damages that Pratt sought were the cost of the book, punitive damages
in the amount of the book and postage costs for James Jeans. Id.
12. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides for proceedings in forma pauperis which allow any
court to waive the payment of fees and costs provided that the person seeking the waiver
makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).
13. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 818. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) provides in pertinent part that U[t]he
court ... may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that
the action is frivolous and malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
14. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819.
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II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Pratt l5 the Ninth Circuit considered the propriety of the
district court's dismissal of Pratt's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and on the merits. IS The Ni~th Circuit explained that a complaint can be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction when it is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous.,,!1 It also
noted that because the action was submitted pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915,18 it could be dismissed if it was "frivolous or malicious. "111 The court defined a frivolous action as one which
lacked an arguable basis in law or fact.20
To analyze whether Pratt's complaint was frivolous, the
Ninth Circuit examined Bell v. Wolfish,21 a Supreme Court case
about regulations affecting the receipt of hard-cover books by
inmates. In Wolfish, pretrial detainees brought a class action
suit challenging the constitutionality of conditions at a shortterm federal correctional facility.22 The Supreme Court addressed the facility's "publishers only" reguiation that limited
the books and magazines that detainees could receive to those
mailed from publishers or book clubs.23 The Supreme Court held
that a "publisher and bookstore only" regulation limited to
hard-cover books was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction and did not violate the first amendment.24 The Court
explained that hard-cover books are difficult to search effectively
and that contraband could be easily smuggled in the bindings. It
concluded that the limited restriction was a reasonable response
to the government's interest in prison security.25
15. 807 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1987).
16. [d. at 819.

17. Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682·83 (1946».
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).
19. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819.
20. [d. This definition had been previsouly used by the Ninth Circuit in Franklin v.
Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984). [d.
21. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
22. [d. at 523. The Supreme Court defined pretrial detainees as "those persons who
have been charged with a crime but who have not yet been tried on the charge." [d.
23. [d. at 549.
24. [d. at 550-52. The Court noted, however, that it did not express a view "as to the
validity of those portions of the lower courts' rulings that concern magazine or soft-cover
books." [d. at 550 n. 31.
25. [d. at 550-51.
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the Wolfish Court's holding
was influenced by factors that were not present in the instant
case. 26 In Wolfish, soft-cover books were not susceptible to the
"publisher or bookstore only" regulation and, therefore, softcover books were viewed as alternatives to obtaining hard-cover
reading material. In Pratt, there were no such alternatives because the "publishers or bookstore only" regulation applied to
both soft-cover and hard-cover books.2 '1 Also the policy in Wolfish affected pretrial detainees who were incarcerated for not
more than 60 days where Pratt was serving a felony sentence
presumed to be significantly longer. 28 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because Pratt's complaint concerned a soft-cover
book and there were differing factors involved, his complaint
raised issues that the Supreme Court had not decided. 29
The court noted that the two Supreme Court cases SO on
which the district court had relied did not involve the first
amendment or an inmate's complaint that he was denied meaningful access to the courts. S1 The Ninth Circuit then distinguished the Fifth Circuit decision in Guajardo v. Estelie,32
which upheld a "publisher and bookstore only" regulation regarding publications in general. 33 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that because Guajardo was decided before Wolfish, it could not
rely on Guajardo's holding. 3 • The court also explained that no
case had examined a prohibition of books mailed directly from
an author to inmates.
26. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819.
[T]he Court in Wolfish was 'influenced by several other factors,' including (1) the fact that there were sufEcient, unburdensome alternative means oC obtaining reading materials,
i.e., so/teover [sic] books Crom any source and a 'relatively
large' library for inmate use and (2) the fact that the poli(;y
affected only pretrial detainees, whose stays in the institution
were limited to approximately 60 days.
[d. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551-52 (1979» (emphasis in original).
27. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819-20.
28. [d.
29. [d. at 819.
30. Block v. RutherCord, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984).
31. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 818, 820.
32. 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. [d. at 762.
34. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 820.

-
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The Ninth Circuit held that Pratt's claim was not frivolous
because it raised legal issues that neither the Supreme Court nor
the Ninth Circuit had decided.S5 The court, therefore, reversed
the judgment below and remanded the case to the district
court. at
lli. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit carefully examined the issues raised and
relevant case law and found that neither the Supreme Court nor
the Ninth Circuit had resolved the constitutionality of a total
ban on felony inmates receiving books from sources other than
publishers and bookstores. The court determined that Pratt's
claim that he was denied meaningful access to the courts because prison officials returned law books sent by their authors
constituted a bona fide complaint that deserved a hearing on its
merits.

Christopher W. Coffey·

SMITH V. CITY OF FONTANA: NINTH
CIRCUIT UPHOLDS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION
DESPITE STATE POST-DEPRIVATION
REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. City of Fontana, l the Ninth Circuit held, inter
alia, that a civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,S
35. [d. at 819-20.
36. [d. tit 820.

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987
I. 807 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986)(per Norris, J.; the other panel members were Tang,
J.; Alarcon, J.)
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State ••• subjects, or causes to be

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 5

14

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:13

could be maintained for violation of a decedent's substantive
due process rights even where there exists a post-deprivation
state remedy.3 The court also held that the constitutional interest in familial companionship warranted children's claims for violation of their personal substantive due process rights when
their father died as a result of excessive force used by two policemen during his detention. 4 Construing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, since material disputes existed as to the factors necessary to state a substantive due process claim, the
Ninth Circuit held that dismissal of the action was improper.&
The court reversed and remanded to try the disputed issues.6
The suit arose from the death of Rufus A. Smith, a black
man, slain by two police officers during an investigation of a domestic quarrel." The offi~ers detained Mr. Smith in the parking
lot of his apartment complex to question him concerning an alleged domestic quarrel. a According to the allegations, as Mr.
Smith attempted to comply with the officers' orders to place his
hands on his head, the officers assaulted him.1I Mr. Smith was
unarmed and offered only instinctive resistence against the attack. 1o One of the officers then drew his revolver and shot Mr.
Smith in the back. l l Mr. Smith died later in surgery.l:I
Plaintiffs brought suit in the federal district court against
the two police officers, the City of Fontana and various city officials, claiming the defendants' conduct violated the due process
subjected, any citizen of the United States ••. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunitiea secured by the
constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for
redress.

Id.
3. Smith, 807 F.2d at 798-99.
4. Id. at 802.
5. Id. at 799. The district court dismissed pursuant to FED. R CIY. P. 12(b)(6) which
states the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 797.
6. Smith, 807 F.2d at 805.
7. Id. at 798.
8.ld.
9. Id. One officer clenched Mr. Smith in a chokehold while the other officer kneed

him in the groin and struck him in the face. Id.
10.ld.
11.ld.
12.ld.
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and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 13
and the first, fourth, fifth and eighth amendments of the United
States Constitution.14 Mrs. Smith sued as administratrix of the
decedent's estate to vindicate Mr. Smith's Civil rights. 111 Mrs.
Smith and her children also sued to vindicate their own civil
rights. UI The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a
claim on the ground that California's post-deprivation remedies
for violation of state tort law were sufficient to protect the plaintiffs from suffering any cognizable constitutional injury.18 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.18
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by reviewing Parratt v.
Taylor,20 a Supreme Court case relied upon by the district court,
and found that dismissal of plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
was improper.21
In Parratt v. Taylor,22 the Supreme Court held that a
state's post-deprivation remedy satisfied constitutional due process when a state actor negligently deprived a prisoner of a mi13. [d. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in pertinent part: "[No State shall) deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 1<> any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.s. CONST. amend. )tIV

§ 1.

14. Smith, 807 F.2d at 798.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 805.

20. 451 U.S. 527 (198l). According to Parrott, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, two
essential elements must be present: (1) The conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of law; (2) The conduct must have deprived a
person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. [d. at 531-35. Furthermore, to establish a valid fourteenth amendment
claim, a deprivation must occur as a result of an established state procedure. [d. at 543.
A state's post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim's due process rights.
[d. at 538.
21. Smith v. City of Fontana, 807 F.2d at 798.
22. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled to the extent that mere lack of due care by a state
official will not deprive an individual of life, liberty or property under the fourteenth
amendment, 54 U.S.L.W. 4090·91 (1986).
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nor property interest." The Ninth Circuit distinguished Parratt,
finding that Parratt applied only when the state's post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim's procedural due
process rights. U Here, the court explained, the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights were violated25 for "the constitutional violation [was] complete at the moment the action or deprivation occur[red]."28 Procedural due process violations, on the
other hand, occur when the state does not provide adequate
safeguards surrounding the action. 27 Therefore, the existence of
a state post-deprivation remedy will not curtail a cause of action
for violation of substantive due process under § 1983.28

A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

The court thus analyzed the claims that the officers' conduct and the city's policies violated the plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights. 211 The court held that while Mr. Smith's estate
could bring suit on his behalf, Mr. Smith's children could not
bring suit in their individual capacities. 30
The court noted that deadly force used in an apprehension
or a detention is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment.lll A claim of excessive force
23. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541·44. A prison inmate had ordered hobby materials
through the mail. The packages were lost through negligence by two prison employees.
The Court held that the inmate could not state a § 1983 action for the state had a tort
claims procedure which would have fully compensated the inmate for his property 1083.
[d. at 530-44.
24. Smith, 807 F.2d at 798-99 (emphasis in original).
25. [d. (emphasis in original).
26. [d. at 799.
27. [d.
28. [d. (quoting Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986».

Since substantive due process is violated at the moment the harm occurs, "the existence
of a post-deprivation state remedy should not have any bearing on whether a cause of
action exists under § 1983." Rutherford, 780 F.2d at 1447. See Shah v. County of Los
Angeles, 797 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1986) (Parratt did not bar a § 1983 suit. based on violations of substantive due process where complaint alleged sheriff's deputies assaulted and
harassed plaintiff); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (availability of
state court relief did not bar federal relief under § 1983 for alleged prison guard
brutality).
29. Smith, 807 F.2d at 799-801.
30. [d. at BOO-01.
31. [d. at 799-BOO. The fourth amendment. states in part. that the "right of the pe0ple to be secure in their persons • • . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ..•." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was made appli-
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used during a personal seizure states a § 1983 claim for relief
predicated on the fourth amendment. 32 Such a claim must be
analyzed in conjunction with such factors as the officer's safety,
the reason for the apprehension, and the extent of injury
inflicted. 33
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,34 a § 1983 claim that arose before
death is actionable after death in California if brought by the
decedent's administrator.35 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held
that Mr. Smith's fourth amendment claim survived his death
and could be brought by Mrs. Smith as administratrix of his estate. 3S However, since the Supreme Court has held that "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which. . . may not be vicariously asserted,"37 Mr. Smith's children could not maintain
personal causes of action under § 1983 for they were not directly
subjected to the excessive use of force. U
B.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

1.

The Estate's Substantive Due Process Claim
The district court in Smith v. City of Fontana found that

cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949).
32. Smith, S07 F.2d at 800. See Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985)
(allegation of excessive force used while transporting plaintiffs states a § 1983 claim for
fourth amendment violation); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985)
(alleged beating and killing of suspect during detention stated a § 1983 claim for fourth
amendment violation).
33. Smith, 807 F.2d at 800 (quoting McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1011 (9th
Cir. 1984». See Tennesse v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)(lack of probable cause to believe
suspect poses a threat of serious harm to officers or others constitutes an unreasonable
seizure when deadly force is used to prevent escape).
34. 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1982) states in pertinent part:
(Where the1laws of the United States .•• are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the (forum1 State
• • • 80 far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, (shall govern1.

Id.
35. Smith, S07 F.2d at BOO. See CAL. PROD. CoDE § 573 (West Supp. 1986). "(NJo
cause of action (is) lost by reason of the death of any person but may be maintained by
... his ... administrator." CAL. PROD. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1986).
36. Smith, S07 F.2d at 800.
37. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
38. Smith, S07 F.2d at SOl.
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Mr. Smith's estate had asserted only a procedural due process
claim under the fourteenth amendment. 3il The Ninth Circuit
held this ruling to be erroneous since it determined that the estate correctly alleged a substantive due process claim under §
1983.40

In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on numerous
circuit court decisions which held that flagrant government actions, such as the use of unwarranted violent physical force, constitutes a violation of substantive due process. 41 Such a claim
must be analyzed in light of several factors to determine the reasonableness of the officer's actions. 42 Since triable issues of fact
existed as to whether or not such factors were present in Smith,
the dismissal was improper. 43

2. The Children's Personal Substantive Due Process Claim
The Ninth Circuit, after an extensive discussion of case law
and legislative history, held that the children of the decedent
had validly stated a claim based on the violation of their personal substantive due process rights under § 1983. This claim
arose out of the death of their father.44
Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined if the
death of a family member caused by a government act "deprives
other family members of a cognizable liberty interest in con tin39. Id. (emphasis in the original).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. See Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1986) (allegations
of assault and harassment by sheriff deputies, if true, stated a violation of substantive
due process); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 7SO (9th Cir. 1986) (brutality used during a
strip search, if true, constituted a violation of substantive due process); Rutherford v.
City of Berkeley, 7SO F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (complaint alleging unprovoked assault
and battery, if true, constituted a violation of substantive due process); Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975) (unprovoked assault on prisoner suffering an attack of
emphysema would constitute a violation of substantive due process).
42. Smith, S07 F.2d at SOl. A court must look to the need for the application of
force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury sustained. Id. The court
must determine whether "the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."
Id. (quoting Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 7SO F.2d 1444. 1446 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Johnson v. Glick. 481 F.2d 1028. 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. Smith. S07 F.2d at SOl.
44.ld.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss1/5

10

Coffey and Mullane: Civil Rights

1987]

CIVIL RIGHTS

19

ued association with the decedent,"45 the Ninth Circuit found
that substantive familial rights are basic civil rights of man1.dnd.41 In Morrison v. Jones," for example, the Ninth Circuit
held that a mother could bring a § 1983 action for damages to
vindicate her familial rights when county officials removed her
mentally ill child from her custody on the grounds that she was
incapable of providing adequate care for him.48
III Kelson v. City of Springfield," parents brought an action
under § 1983 for violations of their fundamental parental
rights,IIO alleging that school officials negligently allowed their
son to commit suicide. III The Kelson court held that the plaintiffs could maintain such an action for "a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child."112 The court in Smith, then, extended
this liberty interest to protect children against state interference
with their relat!onship with their parents without due process of
law. liS
Reviewing the legislative history of the forerunner of § 1983,
the Ku Klux Klan Act,1I4 the Ninth Circuit found compelling
support for their ruling. 1I11 The Act was described as a remedy for
wrongs committed "to the children whose father had been killed
• • • • "111 Thus, the court held that Mr. Smith's children could
maintain a § 1983 claim for violation of their substantive due
45.Id.
46. Id. at 802 (quoting Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979», cert.
denied, 445 U.s. 962 (1980), (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942».
47. 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
48. Morrison, 607 F.2d at 1269.
49. 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985).
SO. Id. at 653. The parents claimed the defendants violated their rights guaranteed
by the first and ninth amendments without due process of law. Id.
51.Id.
52. Id. at 655.
53. Smith, 807 F.2d at 802. The court noted that the Supreme Court case on which
Morrison and Kelson relied concerned suits by parents of minor children. Nevertheless,
the court did not believe this would justify protecting only parents and not children.Id.
The court observed that an argument could be made that a child may have an even
greater interest in the protection of parental relationships for though parents may have
other biological children, a child cannot replace a biological parent. Id. at 802 n.9.
54. Ku Klux Klan Act, c.22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
55. Smith, 807 F.2d at 803.
56. See CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 807 (1871).
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process rights under the fourteenth amendment.57
C.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

The estate alleged that Mr. Smith's right to equal protection was violated because the excessive force used in his detention was the result of the city's unwritten policy sanctioning
such force against blacks.58 The court concluded that the estate
could maintain a survival action for damages, for if the allegations were proven, a violation of equal protection based on race
would stand. lit
The children's equal protection challenge was based on possible future race-related discrimination through the use of excessive force against blacks by the police department.40 The children alleged that the policy of the city and the propensity of the
two police officers involved in the suit to engage in the use of
excessive force, threatened the physical security of all black people in the police department's jurisdiction.·1
As with the estate's equal protection claim,SJ the court determined that if the children's allegations were proven, a violation of equal protection would result. sa Therefore, the children
validly asserted a cause of action for injunctive relief for violation of their fourteenth amendment equal protection rights.&4

D.

REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' first, fifth, and eighth amendment claims.
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 811
57. Smith, 807 F.2d at 803.
58.Id.
59.Id.
60. Id. at 804.
61.Id.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
63. Smith, 807 F.2d at 804.
64.Id.
65.Id.
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With respect to the first amendment claim, the o:.-ourt found
that the complaint did not allege that the officet"a' conduct nor
the city's policy interfered with the plaintiffs' right of free
speech or association, except that the children's first amendment
right to intimate association was relevant to the assertion of
their substantive due process claim." The fifth amendment
claim was properly dismissed as repetitive of the fourteenth
amendment claim.'7 Finally, the dismissal of the eighth amendment claim was sustained, ~ince that amendment protects only
those who have been convicted of a crime."

TIl. CONCLUSION
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit upheld the right of a plaintiff to
assert a claim under § 1983 for violation of the decedent's substantive due process rights in spite of the existence of a state
tort remedy. The court determined that Pa"att v. Taylor
barred such § 1983 claims only when they were limited to procedural due process allegations. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the continued life of substantive due process claims
under the fourteenth amendment. This decision preserves important federal avenues of legal redress for those who have been
victims of police brutality.
l~aureen

66.Id.
67.Id.
68.Id.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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